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I. INTRODUCTION
The perpetuation of workplace harassment and the curtailment of
speech are the Scylla and Charybdis, the choice between the six-headed
monster and the ferocious vortex, which Congress confronted when
drafting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 The tension between these
two evils and the corresponding friction between the aspiration to foster
workplace equality while at the same time upholding free speech lie at the
tectonic plates of Title VII and have led many commentators to assert that
Title VII rests on delicate First Amendment grounds. Perhaps the most
contentious area of Title VII is the hostile work environment doctrine. 2 It
is within the context of hostile work environment law where the strained
efforts of Congress to buoy Title VII, despite the tension between equality
and freedom from workplace invective and abuse on the one hand and
robust speech rights on the other, is most evident. As a result of the
inherent difficulties that enshrouded Congress' effort to inject Title VII
with more than a scintilla of efficacy, Title VII, and especially hostile work
environment harassment law, has been bombarded by criticism in the
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986) (interpreting
Title VII as not being "limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination" but as
encompassing the "'entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment," including coercing people to work in an abusive or hostile work environment
(quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13
(1978)); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-1604.11 (1999).
766 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:3
scholarly realm by proponents of broad speech rights.
While scholars have primarily assaulted the constitutionality of the
hostile work environment doctrine by carping on the validity of its very
elements and by asserting that it suppresses protected speech,3 the predicate
for a more recent line of scrutiny pertains to the incentive effects that
hostile work environment imposes on employers to censor employees. The
term "collateral censorship" has been coined in scholarly literature to
describe the component of hostile work environment that has more recently
been questioned.4 Professor J.M. Balkin, who incidentally concludes that
collateral censorship is often constitutional, succinctly details the process
through which collateral censorship occurs as one where an employer
censors the speech of her employee because she fears that she will suffer
liability as a result of the employee's speech. 5 Unlike those that engage in
a facial attack against hostile work environment doctrine, scholars
emphasizing the issue of collateral censorship often concede that speech
directly abridged by hostile work environment doctrine is unprotected but
caution that it inevitably entices employers to also censor a broad array of
protected and even highly esteemed employee speech in order to avoid
liability.6 While the scholarly treatment of collateral censorship, as of this
writing, has primarily relied on doctrinal and social policy analyses to
3. Hostile work environment has been criticized for being overbroad,
unconstitutionally vague, and for engaging in content discrimination. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85
GEO L.J. 627, 628 (1997) (exploring the types of speech that fall under the ambit of hostile
work environment law under its current definition); Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace
Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579, 582 (1995)
[hereinafter Browne, Workplace Censorship] (arguing that hostile work environment law is
extremely vague and therefore invites sweeping restrictions on speech); Kingsley R.
Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 481 (1991) [hereinafter Browne, Title VII as Censorship]
(asserting that the breadth of hostile work environment law renders it at least "content-
based" and perhaps even "viewpoint-based").
4. The term "collateral censorship" was first utilized in Michael I. Meyerson, Authors,
Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the "Speaker" Within the New Media, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 116, 118 (1995), and one of the earliest assessments of its
constitutionality is found in J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 2295 (1999). However, many commentators have contemplated the problem of
collateral censorship without referring to it by name. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 638
(maintaining that hostile work environment compels all rational employers to subject
employee speech to a "zero tolerance" policy).
5. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2296.
6. The First Amendment is implicated whenever censorship is spurred by the fear of
legal liability, regardless of whether the censor is a public or private employer. See infra
notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Potential First Amendment issues related to both a
private employer's unilateral censorship of speech that occurs without government impetus
and collateral censorship inspired by the fear of a quid pro quo harassment suit are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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appraise its constitutionality, an analysis of collateral censorship that
applies it against First Amendment free speech theories and values can also
provide valuable insight into the validity of hostile work environment
doctrine.
An instructive means for assessing hostile work environment law's
compatibility with the First Amendment in light of collateral censorship is
to apply some of the reasonably foreseeable effects of collateral censorship
against the crucible of those theories that have most frequently been
proposed as normative explanations for both free speech and the
restrictions to which speech can be constitutionally subjected. The
marketplace of ideas7 and the notion of individual liberty8 are two of the
preeminent jurisprudential bases for First Amendment speech protection
that may serve as valid and reliable measures for determining whether or
not the hostile work environment doctrine excessively impinges upon free
speech values.9 It is important to subject hostile work environment and
collateral censorship to the scrutiny of both theories due to the fact that
proponents of each often assert that the other does not adequately undergird
the First Amendment. ° Further, the majority of alternative explanations
provided for free speech appear to be either variations of one of the theories
or attempts to narrow one of them.
This Comment first proceeds by evaluating the scope of hostile work
environment doctrine and detailing the types of expression that routinely
succumb to it. It then explores the pervasive effects of collateral
7. The marketplace of ideas theory champions the protection of speech since
protection promotes robust and pervasive public debate, and it contends that free speech is
important for the intellectual, cultural, and political enrichment of society because truth is
best achieved through "the free trade in ideas." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. Liberty theorists reject the position that speech is only valuable as a means for
promoting truth and argue that speech is intrinsically important, even without considering its
communicative element, because it is a manifestation of human autonomy. See Charles
Fried, Speech in the Welfare State: The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 233 (1992).
9. Even though the marketplace of ideas and individual liberty are the values that are
most frequently evoked by scholars and by judges as supporting free speech, they are by no
means the only ones. Examples of alternative First Amendment values, which often,
incidentally, overlap with the marketplace of ideas and liberty theories, include:
ALEXANDER MIEKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)
(opining that the First Amendment exists only to protect political or public speech); Steven
H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Meaning of America, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND
RIGHTS, 307, 318 (Sarat & Kearns eds., 1995) (arguing that the protection of dissent is
among the foremost First Amendment values).
10. Compare C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989)
(asserting that liberty theory should supplant marketplace of ideas as the primary First
Amendment theory) with Owen M. Fiss, Comment, State Activism and State Censorship,
100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991) (positing that individual autonomy and liberty are subordinate to
the value of robust public discourse).
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censorship and analyzes the extent to which it magnifies the speech
restrictions already exacted by hostile work environment doctrine.
Subsequently, the Comment outlines the underlying values of marketplace
of ideas theory and sets forth instances where it condones circumscribing
expression. After applying the effects of collateral censorship against the
tenets and dictates of marketplace of ideas theory, the Comment concludes
that they are inconsistent largely because of the remarkable scope of
collateral censorship and due to its conceptual nexus with prior restraints.
Following its treatment of the marketplace of ideas, the Comment presents
the fundamental values of liberty theory and employs them as crucibles for
the validity of collateral censorship. It once again concludes that collateral
censorship does not pass muster primarily because it frequently limits
speech that represents attempts by employees to engage in self-
actualization even when such expression is not inimical to the liberty
interests of other individuals. The Comment ultimately contends that even
though traditional First Amendment values are antagonistic toward
collateral censorship, the latter may find succor in regulatory theories and
doctrines proposed to ameliorate the adverse and inequitable
epiphenomenal effects of either a robust marketplace of ideas or an
expansive individual liberty right.
II. THE EFFECTS OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW AND
COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP
A. Hostile Work Environment Doctrine
1. The Breadth of Hostile Work Environment Law
The scope of the problem of collateral censorship is both informed and
evidenced by the broad definition of hostile work environment and the
myriad of contexts in which it can expectedly cause liability. The fact that
hostile work environment law alone imposes elaborate constraints on
speech accentuates the magnitude and profundity of the speech curtailment
that results once the effects of collateral censorship are also calculated.
Under Title VII, as construed by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank and its progeny, speech may qualify as workplace harassment if it is
sufficiently "severe or pervasive" as to "alter the conditions of the victim's
employment" and to engender a "hostile or abusive work environment"
from the perspective of both the "plaintiff or a reasonable person" and is
based on race, religion, sex, and national origin.1" Subsequent court cases
11. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
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have extended the actionable categories to include harassment based on age
and disability.1" Various legislative enactments have also augmented the
ambit of litigable workplace harassment to include that which is directed at
former armed service members13 or that which is based on marital status,
sexual orientation, 14 or political ideology.'
5
The substantial breadth of hostile work environment doctrine is not
only evidenced by the panoply of actionable classes that it encompasses,
but it is also demonstrated by virtue of the fact that the gravamen of
liability is whether the conduct of the workplace is offensive when it is
"taken as a whole." 16 Accordingly, an individual's speech that is itself not
actionable can be brought under the sweep of liability if it is followed by
that of a different speaker. The fact that the Supreme Court allows hostile
work environments to materialize in a piecemeal manner indicates that acts
that are wholly innocuous when viewed in isolation can evolve into acts of
harassment since they can be regarded in conjunction with entirely
unrelated acts of others. Thus, in a manner resembling strict liability, the
agency of a given speaker is often afforded severely diminished
significance in proceedings determining her liability. Moreover, in
addition to penalizing behavior that only amounts to harassment when
viewed in the aggregate, hostile work environment can also penalize speech
that is not directed at the plaintiff. 7
The breadth of hostile work environment doctrine is further magnified
by the latitude that plaintiffs possess in determining whether hostility has
occurred. In Harris, a female employee alleged that she was subjected to
frequent gender oriented insults and sexual innuendos by the president of
her company but failed to adduce specific physical or psychological injury.
The Supreme Court held that sustaining a hostile work environment claim
does not require averring serious psychological injury but merely
necessitates demonstrating both the existence of a work environment that a
"reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-as well as the victim's
subjective perception that the environment is abusive."' 8
Even though Harris requires both an objective and a subjective prong,
the holding leaves plaintiffs ample leeway for filing claims arising from a
remarkable pastiche of scenarios. First, conspicuously absent from the
elements of hostile work environment is any requirement that speech must
12. Volokh, supra note 3, at 627 n.4 (citing Eggleston v. South Bend Comty. Sch.
Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 847-48 (N.D. Ind. 1994)).
13. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (1994)).
14. Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981 & Supp. 1988)).
15. Id. (citing SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 14.04.040 (1986)).
16. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
17. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2297.
18. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
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be of a particular kind to qualify as harassment. 9 The absence of
meaningful criteria for narrowing actionable expression marks a stark
departure from some of the other areas where speech restrictions are
permissible, such as obscenity, where speech must, inter alia, appeal "to a
prurient interest in sex, 2° libel, where speech must be false,2' and fighting
words, where speech must have "a direct tendency to cause violence by the
persons to whom, individually, the words are addressed., 22 As a result, the
success of harassment claims depends largely on the plaintiff perceiving
speech as offensive, and the types of speech to which plaintiffs can legally
allege offense are seemingly boundless. Secondly, the objective prong
does not necessarily substantially inhibit any types of claims from being
filed. Directly correlated to the unique heterogeneity of the American
population is the existence of an immeasurable quantity of diverse moral,
cultural, social, and religious beliefs and gestalts. Embodied in this
multifarious spectrum of ideology is a broad array of precipitants for
offense and insult. Therefore, since the amorphous mental state of offense
is the sine qua non of a hostile work environment, the outcome of the
reasonableness inquiry is wildly unpredictable and is subject to tremendous
variance depending primarily on the demographics of the community from
which the jury pool is drawn.
Even though hostile work environment doctrine imposes profound
burdens on workplace speech, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
proffered effective safeguards for succoring beneficial speech from being
subsumed under the massive umbrella of liability that it erects. An
ostensible bulwark is the requirement that the speech or conduct be
"severe" or "pervasive. 23  However, the fact that the Court set forth a
"totality of circumstances" standard means that no individual utterance or
act truly can be immune from the sweep of liability due to the fact that it
may be aggregated with other subsequent and independent speech or
conduct. Furthermore, one can never be sure that her expression will not
be perceived as offensive when considering the dizzying array of beliefs
and convictions that are embodied within any given workplace or jury all
19. Volokh, supra note 3, at 628-29.
20. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973) (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413,418 (1966)).
21. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-48 (1974) (permitting libel
claims for speech against private individuals even when the falsehood results from
negligence); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring for
libel claims for speech against public officials either knowledge of falsehood or reckless
disregard of whether statement was false or not).
22. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a Neo-Nazi
rally at city hall cannot be barred under fighting words doctrine since those that may be
provoked by it can simply avoid the location where it is to be conducted).
23. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
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of which may be offended by very different types of stimuli.
2. Examples of Expression Curtailed by Hostile Work Environment
Doctrine
Examples of both theoretical and actual cases where harassment
claims predicated on hostile work environment theory may be upheld also
exemplify the highly inimical relationship that exists between speech and
Title VII harassment law even when the robust effects of collateral
censorship are omitted from the calculus. Professor Volokh contends that
hostile work environment can easily cover some of the forms of expression
that are most venerated by American society, including political, literary
and artistic expression.24 For example, posters replicating nude sculptures
or paintings, many of which are comfortably ensconced in the most
prestigious museums and enjoy the status of being among the most
heralded cultural icons of Western civilization, can conceivably offend
employees from a plethora of different backgrounds. Even employees who
are not abnormally squeamish may be offended at the sight of the
lascivious pose of the characters portrayed in Picasso's famed Les
Demoiselles d'Avignon, the primeval orgy depicted in Bosch's The Garden
of Earthly Delight, or even the plain nudity manifest in Michelangelo's
David.
Similarly, expression of political or social views whether asserted
nakedly or embodied in a joke may also offend both plaintiffs and the
reasonable juror. For example, a slogan or a statement supporting
controversial political and social figures, such as former Nixon
speechwriter Patrick Buchanan or filmmaker Michael Moore, or even more
mainstream ones, such as Senators Trent Lott or the late Strom Thurmond,
can realistically be interpreted as offensive under a doctrine that leaves the
criteria for offense largely in the hands of the offended. Moreover, offense
can result even when statements are made with the sincere intent to
advance the legitimate purpose and goals of the workplace. A recent
illustration is the tempestuous reaction of many of the participants at a
conference sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research to
statements made by keynote speaker, Harvard University President
Lawrence H. Summers. Summers suggested that females may be
underrepresented in university mathematics, engineering, and physical
sciences departments as a result of innate biological differences in sex. His
remarks were immediately pilloried and a maelstrom reaction ensued both
among participants and the greater academic community. In fact, one
24. Volokh, supra note 3, at 635.
25. See Sam Dillon & Sara Rimer, No Break in the Storm Over Harvard President's
Words, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 2005, at A14 (discussing the reaction to President Summers'
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female academic roiled by his comments stormed out of the room during
the speech, later saying that upon hearing Summers' comments, "I just
couldn't breathe because this kind of bias makes me physically ill."
26
Despite a pervasive, albeit non-unanimous, sentiment that Summers'
remarks are inappropriate, unscientific, or baseless, few would doubt that
they were rendered with the sincere intent to vigorously promote the
purpose of the conference. Nevertheless, if it were possible to make the
argument that the conference constituted a workplace, it is plausible that a
Court would not readily jettison a claim that Summers' comments
contributed to a hostile work environment.
Case law provides empirical testimony toward the extensive breadth
of hostile work environments even when its effects have not been amplified
as a result of the influence of collateral censorship. Professor Volokh
provides a barrage of cases where hostile work environment claims
succeeded despite penalizing speech that stands in marked contrast to the
types of boorish insults and innuendoes that resonate with one's conception
of quintessential acts of harassment.27  For example, a state court
determined that an employer that put religious articles into its employee
newsletter and "Christian-themed verses on its paychecks" engaged in
religious discrimination,28 while a district court proclaimed that the use of
gender based job titles, such as "foreman" and "draftsman," may amount to
harassment.2 9  There are also empirical examples of courts harnessing
political expression, which arguably enjoys the most deference from the
vantage of First Amendment values, under the canopy of hostile work
environment liability. In one such example, an employee who as a
purported expression of patriotism adorned his cubicle with a picture of an
American flag being burned in Iran was held to have had engaged in
nationality discrimination against an Iranian coworker.30
Many proponents of Title VII attempt to downplay the broadness of
the contours of hostile work environment and dismiss the aforementioned
cases and those of their ilk as aberrations. Professor Epstein, one such
commentator, describes Volokh's examples as "bizarre judicial
misapplications."'" Volokh astutely responds to Epstein's rejoinder by
comments on women in academia).
26. Sam Dillon, Harvard Chief Defends His Talk on Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2005, at A16.
27. Volokh, supra note 3, at 629-35.
28. Id. at 630 (citing Brown Transp. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 578 A.2d 555, 562).
29. Id. at 631 (citing Tunis v. Coming Glass Works, 747 F. Supp 951, 959 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd without opinion, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991)).
30. Id. at 632 (citing Pakizegi v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp 901, 908 (D.
Mass. 1993) (dictum) affd without opinion, 56 F.3d 59 (1 Cir. 1995)).
31. See Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J.
[Vol. 8:3
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stressing that the absence of limitations in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of hostile work environment in cases like Harris militates
against the claim that the cases that he cites are anomalous.3 2  Volokh
appears correct when considering the murkiness surrounding the elements
and safeguards adumbrated in Harris coupled with the fact that the
evocation of hostile work environment turns on the existence of offense,
which rarely represents a monolithic reaction to a particular stimulus.33
3. Durational Significance of Hostile Workplace Environment Law
and its Effects on Employee Expression Outside of the
Workplace
A final factor that compounds the draconian burden that hostile
workplace doctrine imposes on speech is the sheer number of hours that the
average American employee spends in the workplace. Not only are
employees subject to substantial speech restrictions while they are at work,
but the proscriptions are also imposed on them for protracted durations of
time since they are at work so frequently. According to data issued by the
International Labour Organization, employees in the United States worked
more hours in 2000 than those in any other country in the world, spending
on average 1979 hours annually in the workplace.34 That figure amounts to
49.5 weeks per year and represents a hike of 36 hours per year since 1990."5
Furthermore, American workers averaged 137 more hours than their
Japanese counterparts who ranked as the second most prolific workers and
typically only enjoyed two to three weeks vacation per year while
European employees retreated for holiday leave for four to six weeks each
year.36 Moreover, an International Labour Organisation study suggests that
399, 417-18 (1996) (exploring the conflict between freedom of speech in the form of
workplace expression and gender fairness in the form of professional opportunity).
32. Volokh, supra note 3, at 634-35.
33. The unpredictability of offense is compounded by the fact that it is often futile to
rely on proxies, such as an individual's race, religion, ethnicity, class, gender, or education,
to predict whether offense will result from a particular stimulus. This is evidenced by the
recent incident involving Lawrence Summers, discussed supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text, where certain female academics reacted with rancorous outrage and
offense to Summers' speech while others displayed a much more sanguine response to
Summers' comments. For example, whereas Denice D. Denton, then the Dean of
Engineering at the University of Washington, interrupted Summers' speech to confront him
over his remarks, Hanna M. Gray, a former president of the University of Chicago,
expressed support for Summers, describing him as "deeply respectful of the role of women
in universities." Dillon & Rimer, supra note 25, at A14.
34. Steven Greenhouse, Americans 'International Lead in Hours Worked Grew in 90's,
Report Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001 at A8 (comparing recent work hour trends among
various regions and countries).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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work hours in the United States will continue their upward trend and
describes the United States as "the only country in the industrialized world
where working hours are increasing., 37 While the sharp increase in time
spent working is descriptive of employment conditions of both males and
females, it is starkest with respect to that of female employees.38 In
addition, these figures fail to adequately represent the virtually incessant
workweek that characterizes certain professions, such as law, investment
banking, and medicine, whose practitioners in any given week may toil at
the workplace in excess of 100 hours.
The remarkable amount of time that employees spend at the
workplace also has the additional effect of reducing the quantity and
quality of speech that is expressed outside of the workplace. The fact that
one's commitment to the workplace residually affects his speech when he
is not at work is significant because it militates against the claim that even
though one's ability to speak at work is severely circumscribed by hostile
work environment law, he still enjoys ample or even identical opportunities
for expression when he is not at work. One's workday in several ways
contributes to limitations on his ability to speak even after the workday has
concluded. First, the number of hours invested in work by many
employees is significantly augmented by the daunting commute39 to and
40
from work, which is usually spent alone or silently among strangers.
Secondly, the exhaustion that results from the extensive workday coupled
with the strenuous commute dampens the quality of speech that employees
may engage in if they benefited from more leisure time by inducing them to
spend a preponderance of their time out of work "vegging out" or enjoying
"downtime.' In fact, Robert Putnam concludes that "each additional ten
minutes in daily commuting time cuts involvement in community affairs by
10 percent."42 Thirdly, even if employees succeed in maintaining their zeal
for engaging in active speech, such as expressions of political, civil, or
social activism, outside the confines of the workplace, they are often
37. Americans Work Longest Hours, BBC Online Network, Sept. 6, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/439595.stm.
38. U.S. Department of Labor, Futurework Report-Trends and Challenges for Work in
the 21st Century (Chapter 3-Work and Family), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/progr
amsihistory/herman/reports/futurework/report/chapter3/main.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006)
(discussing the dramatic increase over the past few decades in both the number of women in
the workplace and in the number of hours that women are devoting to work).
39. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN CoMMuNITY 211-15 (2000) (providing a detailed discussion of the increasing
amount of time that Americans invest in their workday commute).
40. Id. at 212 (alleging that in 1995, 91% of Americans commuted to work in private
vehicles while only 61% did so in 1960).
41. Id. at 200 (presenting evidence that working full-time decreases community
involvement).
42. Id. at 213.
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precluded from doing so due to the fact that work hours often coincide with
the periods that fora indispensable for such expression are accessible. For
example, since most government offices are only open during day hours,
employees may have to "play hooky" from work to do so. Moreover,
political expression manifested through attendance of public rallies,
demonstrations, or protests is also diminished because it is often only
conducted effectively when directed at significant audiences, which are
likely to be elusive after work hours.
B. Collateral Censorship
1. Constitutional Implications
Even if one were to concede that the speech suppressed by hostile
work environment doctrine is unprotected, there remains the more vexing
problem of collateral censorship. The collateral censorship conundrum
adds substantial complexity to the analysis of hostile work environment
doctrine because it exponentially magnifies all burdens that the latter
imposes on speech, and because it hovers as an ominous constitutional
cloud over the already dubious terrain of hostile work environment law.
The first complication is straightforward in that there is logically a
proportional relationship between the degree and scope of the demands that
hostile work environment law imposes on employers and the extent to
which they feel compelled to restrict their employees' speech. The second
dilemma is more controversial but sufficiently established in the judicial
and scholarly spheres to represent a standing concern. While one may
contend that collateral censorship does not implicate the First Amendment
because it may in actuality be the private employer rather than the
government that exacts the speech restrictions, the fact that the government
creates incentives and often "expects and desires" that employers will
censor qualifies collateral censorship as state action.
43
Professor Balkin demonstrates that courts, despite not actually using
the term, have affirmatively determined that certain instances of collateral
censorship contravene the Constitution.44  For example, in Smith v.
California, the Supreme Court invalidated a California statute providing
criminal sanctions for bookstores carrying books that are later determined
to be obscene. 45 The Court reasoned that if the seller is deemed liable even
when he lacks knowledge of the books' content, he will limit sales to
include only those books that he has inspected. Thus, the government will
have in effect "imposed a restriction upon the distribution of
43. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2299.
44. Id. at 2302 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)).
45. Id. (quoting Smith, 361 U.S. at 153).
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constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature. 4 6  The Court
further asserted that the fact that the government induces a private actor to
censor rather than actually conducting the censoring itself does not make
the speech suppression any "less virulent. '' 7
2. Breadth of Collateral Censorship
The constitutional dilemmas posed by collateral censorship are
compounded by the fact that the nature of current hostile work environment
doctrine compels virtually all rational employers to engage in collateral
censorship and to do so in a comprehensive and rigorous fashion. An
employer's need for collateral censorship principally arises from the
opaque, bamboozling hostile environment standard set forth by the
Supreme Court that permits aggregation, fails to provide criteria for
limiting the types of speech that can contribute to a hostile environment,
and sets forth only vague safeguards to prevent excessive regulation.48 All
of these factors ineluctably conspire to convince employers that their "only
reliable option" is to promulgate and to stringently enforce a "zero
tolerance policy" that encompasses any speech that can conceivably
aggregate with other expression to amount to a hostile work environment.49
Rational employers are likely to be driven by the incentives
engendered by hostile work doctrine to suppress many modes of expression
that are routinely found in the typical American workplace. For example,
jokes told at water coolers, rap music played in warehouses, and posters of
nude sculptures hanging in cubicles may become a source of consternation
for employers as a result of Title VII. None of these expressive activities is
likely to independently engender a hostile work environment, and all of
them can contribute to productivity in some work settings by rendering the
workplace more hospitable and familiar to those that enjoy them.
However, employers may and should be apprehensive that these works will
agglomerate with other expressive activities to create a hostile work
environment. Furthermore, the employer is inhibited from circumscribing
the scope of prohibitions directed against these activities to encompass, for
example, only certain types of jokes because the hostile work environment
doctrine is one of inclusion rather than exclusion.5' In addition, not only is
a rational employer constrained in his ability to limit speech restrictions to
46. Id. (quoting Smith, 361 U.S. at 153).
47. Id. (quoting Smith, 361 U.S. at 154).
48. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 636 (discussing the vagueness of the Supreme Court's
standard).
49. Id. at 638-39.
50. See Id. at 628 (discussing the scope of restriction of the hostile work environment
harassment law).
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particular types of expression, but he is also likely to be disinclined from
imposing only quantitative restrictions on expression since the definition of
"severe or pervasive" is highly obscure. Further, an employer cannot
instruct his employees that they can speak as they please until the speech
becomes severe or pervasive enough to engender a hostile work
environment since recognizing when this abstract boundary is reached is
impracticable. 1 Ultimately, instituting a draconian, prophylactic regime is
the only secure means for an employer to evade the risks of vicarious
liability.
The incentive for employers to issue a prophylactic and stringent anti-
harassment policy has been further amplified by the Ellerth and Faragher
Supreme Court decisions. 52  In these cases, the Court established an
affirmative defense for instances when a supervisor engages in sexual
harassment that does not involve a "tangible employment action," such as
termination or demotion." In order to benefit from the affirmative defense,
employers must demonstrate that they "exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior" and that the
plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage" of these measures.54 In
addition, even though the Court asserts that the existence of a company
sexual harassment procedure is not per se dispositive, the "need for a stated
policy" is typically integral for adjudicating the first prong.55 In practice,
satisfaction of the first prong seems to require not only that such a policy
exists but also that "the policy is effective."56 Subsequent state cases and
legislation have interpreted the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense as
actually requiring a formal, written company harassment policy.57 Lower
courts have also broadened the EllerthiFaragher rulings by applying them
to categories other than sexual harassment.
58
As a result of these rulings, all rational employers must construct and
51. Id. at 638.
52. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
53. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Albert J. Solecki Jr. & Susan E. Digilio, Having a Written Anti-Harassment Policy
Is No Longer an Option, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 2003.
57. Gaines v. Bellino, 801 A.2d 322 (N.J. 2002) (requiring formal anti-harassment
policy for employers to avoid liability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination);
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 151 B § 3A (2004) (mandating that all employers promulgate formal
anti-harassment policies to remain in compliance with state's fair employment practices
law).
58. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999)
(applying EllerthiFaragher to racial discrimination); Knutson v. Brounstein, No.
99CIV.6094, 2001 WL 1661929 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2001) (expanding EllerthiFaragher to
cover age discrimination).
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disseminate a robust and encompassing anti-harassment policy containing a
harsh set of disciplinary measures. Even though a powerful incentive to do
such existed even before the Ellerth and Faragher rulings, the need for a
policy is now absolutely imperative. Whereas before the existence of the
affirmative defense, employers may have reasoned that in light of strict
liability there is no reason to compromise employee morale by imposing
draconian speech restrictions, they now clearly have that to lose if they fail
to institute a policy. Furthermore, due to the vagaries that obfuscate the
types of expression that can engender liability, they are now replete with
reason to impose an exacting and deeply prophylactic litany of speech
restrictions. In addition, since the policy must have sufficient "teeth" to
effectuate the affirmative defense plea, it is likely to be bolstered by harsh
and exacting disciplinary measures. Thus, the development of hostile work
environment doctrine has spurred vigorous incentives for ubiquitous and
robust speech censorship in the workplace, the location where many
Americans spend most of their time.59
3. Examples of Collateral Censorship
Empirical examples of actual and prototypical harassment policies
evidence both the broadness and the severity of collateral censorship. First,
few harassment policies bother to mention that offensive conduct must be
"severe or pervasive" to amount to a hostile work environment.6 °  For
example, Office Depot provides two sample definitions of harassment for
business owners seeking to draft anti-harassment policies, neither of which
even alludes to the statutory threshold for liability. 6' The omission of this
putative statutory safeguard testifies to its futility in dampening the reach of
hostile work environment doctrine. Secondly, policies also promote the
belief that single acts or expressions routinely result in liability by phrasing
their definitions of harassment in the singular form. Office Depot in its
first sample defines harassment as "verbal or physical conduct that
denigrates or shows hostility," whereas in its second sample asserts that
harassment includes "written or graphic material that denigrates or shows
59. Professor Estlund emphasizes the importance of the workplace for free speech by
asserting that "most adults spend much of their waking life at work, and much of the time
and space that individuals have for political discussion outside their families is at work."
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 733 (1997).
60. Volokh, supra note 3, at 643.
61. E.g., Office Depot, Creating a Zero Tolerance Harassment Policy,
http://www.officedepot.com/renderStaticPage.dojsessionid=0000S4PDDOVOFW3YNPLF
JA llNSY:uhas9119?context=-/content&file=/BusinessTools/text/P05_5185.jsp (last visited
Jan. 19, 2006).
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hostility. 62  Thirdly, harassment policies typically emphasize that the
precipitation of harassment is often divorced from the agency of the
employee by defining harassment as that which "has the purpose or effect"
to offend.63 Finally, policies frequently include catch-all phrases that can
conceivably envelop a myriad of speech activities. For example, Office
Depot characterizes expression that "otherwise adversely affects an
individual's employment opportunities" as harassment. 64  This catch-all
phrase can realistically penalize a supervisor who legitimately reprimands
an employee for poor work performance, since one can erroneously intuit
that the supervisor's criticism arose from disdain toward one of the
actionable categories and can easily conclude that it adversely affected
"individual employment opportunities" by effacing the employee's self-
esteem.65
Legal counsel often encourages employers to engage in collateral
censorship by erring in favor of caution and instructing clients to
indiscriminately prohibit broad categories of expression.66  Mark
Schickman, a former president of the Bar Association of San Francisco,
asserts that
[t]he practical advice for employers evaluating potentially
harassing conduct is to be as conservative as possible. If conduct
might be construed as harassing, it has no place in the workplace.
If an employee.., is not sure whether or not conduct will be
unwelcome, the best advice is to avoid such conduct.6 7
In order to effectively eschew any and all speech that can conceivably
qualify as harassment, Schickman recommends that employers draft a
company policy that posits "a broad definition" of harassment barring "all
behavior that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment., 68 Ultimately, Schickman's bleak assessment
of free speech's status in the workplace is influenced by his belief that in
62. Id. (emphasis added). In contrast to the sample policies, the Supreme Court has, in
fact, stated that a hostile environment claim by its "very nature involves repeated conduct."
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Many theorists, particularly some liberty theorists, would argue that this type of
speech is not protected by the First Amendment since it is not necessarily an example of
self-expression. However, the example merely attempts to illustrate the breadth of collateral
censorship, which often abridges speech that is indispensable for an efficient and productive
workplace.
66. Browne, Workplace Censorship, supra note 3, at 585.
67. Mark I. Schickman, Sexual Harassment: The Employer's Role in Prevention,
http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/compleat/w96shi.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
68. Id.
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light of the scope and unpredictability of hostile work doctrine, prudent
legal counsel must adopt the role of "cynical litigator" and convey to
clients that "the 'bounds of propriety and good taste' are very difficult for a
jury to demarcate two years after the fact."69
Many attorneys have reinforced Schickman's admonitions by
routinely advising employers to forbid employee expression even when it is
a type that is typically concealed from others. For example, attorneys at the
Goodwin Procter law firm suggest that employers may want to proscribe
the posting of "demeaning or derogatory material in employee lockers."7 °
Other legal advice directs employers to forbid employees from saying
anything "around an employee or co-worker that you wouldn't do around
your spouse, your child, or dear old mom."7 Such circumspection is of
course completely rational, because employers have much to lose if they
adopt a relatively permissive attitude toward employee speech, whereas
they risk little if they impose highly restrictive measures on employee
speech.
7 2
The rigor of collateral censorship is also exhibited by the severity of
the disciplinary measures that employers frequently mete out for violations
of speech restrictions. Whereas many anti-harassment statements profess
to employ a policy of progressive discipline, they often provide for swift
escalation, rapidly culminating with measures as drastic as termination.
Most anti-harassment policies also accord to employers a great deal of
leeway in determining the appropriate sanction for non-compliance. For
example, despite recommending that employers "spell out the
consequences" for when an employee is found to have engaged in censored
speech, the sample policies proffered by Office Depot are quite nebulous
when it comes to actually delineating disciplinary measures, only providing
that "any employee who indulges in harassing behavior is subject to
disciplinary measures up to, and including, termination. ,13 American
Express' sample harassment policy sets forth an equally abstruse
disciplinary provision, simply stipulating that violation of company
harassment regulations will result in "immediate and appropriate
69. Id. (quoting Alex Kozinski, Gender Bias, SAN FRANCISCO RECORDER, May 27,
1992).
70. Solecki & Digilio, supra note 56.
71. Volokh, supra note 3, at 640 (quoting Daryl Strickland, Board Games Help
Workers Learn Do 's, Don 'ts ofSexual Harassment, SEArTLE TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996 at El).
72. The main legal repercussions for excessive speech restrictions are wrongful
discharge law, union rules, and civil service regulations. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2298 n.12.
However, these protections are likely to be overshadowed by the fear of Title VII liability.
Some of them are also only germane to a small number of employees since only ten percent
of American employees currently belong to unions. Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2005, at 38.
73. Office Depot, supra note 61.
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disciplinary action including but not limited to possible suspension or
termination. 74 The only certainty that employees enjoy after reading such
policies is that infractions of the speech code may be redressed with
termination, but they can only conjecture about what other punishments are
available as well as what types of expression and what quantity of them
result in termination. Other policies, despite being slightly more
transparent, are even graver. One expert advises employers that in the case
of people who inadvertently employ inappropriate terms, "discipline might
begin with a strong reprimand and a disciplinary suspension. If an incident
occurs again, it may result in termination."75 Moreover, if a pejorative term
is uttered deliberately, the same author counsels that "immediate
termination may be called for.,
76
Some commentators in an attempt to diminish the significance of
collateral censorship have suggested that employers will exercise restraint
in censoring their employers due to their interest in maintaining employee
morale.77 In response, Professor Browne cogently replies that concerns
with employee morale will inevitably be cast aside by employers who "are
unlikely to risk hundreds of thousands of dollars... out of abstract
concerns about employee morale., 7' Employment statistics indirectly
substantiate Browne's claim demonstrating that employee morale appears
to be in general a marginal concern in the typical American workplace,
given that "as many as one of four employees are chronically angry on the
job," and only 36% reported being "completely satisfied" with their job.79
Faced with the prospect of vicarious liability, employers will rationally
implement prophylactic restrictions on speech at the expense of any
importance they would have otherwise attributed to the esteem of their
employees.
4. Summary
Ultimately, even a moderate amount of collateral censorship has a
dramatic and profound effect on both the quality and quantity of employee
speech in the workplace. Under a collateral censorship regime, employers
straightjacket employees into engaging in only a minuscule portion of the
74. American Express, Sample Sexual Harassment Policy, http://wwwlO.americanexpr
ess.com/sif/cda/page/0,1641,15697,00.asp.
75. Volokh, supra note 3, at 629 n.8 (quoting Philip M. Perry, Don't Get Sued for
Racial Discrimination, LAW PRAC. MGMT., July-Aug. 1996, at 42).
76. Id.
77. Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERs L. REv. 461, 551-
54 (1995).
78. Browne, Workplace Censorship, supra note 3, at 583.
79. PUTNAM, supra note 39, at 91.
782 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:3
expression that would be otherwise permissible to them. In addition, such
censorship conjures images of Orwellian totalitarianism since it implicates
not only public expression but also that which occurs in the most private
recesses of the workplace, such as in an employee's locker or personal
email account. Moreover, censorship policies cover not only expression
that is akin to harassment as well as that which represents blueprints for a
hostile work environment but also a good deal of innocuous speech.
Furthermore, those types of expression that are most revered by democratic
principles and society, such as political and artistic expression, frequently
fall victim to collateral censorship regimes. Finally, as a result of the
breadth of these policies coupled with the vagueness of the prescribed
disciplinary measures, employees also will inevitably engage in self-
censorship and avoid asserting a wide spectrum of expression.
III. COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The marketplace of ideas theory posits that vibrant and untrammeled
public debate and discourse are indispensable for the survival of democracy
and for the welfare of society and individual citizens. It has enjoyed
virtually quotidian acceptance in democracies and is for many the putative
normative value that undergirds free speech protections. It asserts that free
speech both fosters democratic and fair governance by cultivating a
sophisticated and educated demos and exalts individuals by facilitating
their efforts to approximate truth and sublime understanding. Since the
marketplace of ideas theory views free speech as a prerequisite for
democratic governance and a sufficiently informed citizenry, its proponents
often regard unbridled expression primarily as an avenue for accomplishing
an ideal rather than as an end in itself"° Furthermore, since speech's value
is predicated on its ability to inform, persuade, and inspire, the marketplace
of ideas theory reserves its approbation only for communicative speech .8
These qualifications of the marketplace of ideas theory's commitment to
promoting an unfettered speech right inform the instances when the theory
sanctions limitations on speech and ultimately shed light on whether
collateral censorship is consonant with the First Amendment.
A. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Marketplace of Ideas
An analysis of the trajectory of the intellectual development of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor in both the juridical sphere and in the realm
80. Fried, supra note 8, at 227.
81. C. Edwin Baker, Harm Liberty and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 979 (1997).
Some commentators limit speech protections to subcategories of communicative speech,
such as political speech. See MIEKLEJOHN, supra note 9.
2006] COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP AND FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 783
of political theory expounds upon the types of expression that it may shield
from or leave susceptible to curtailment. An early precursor to more
formal renditions of marketplace of ideas theory appeared in John Milton's
Areopagitica, which was written in 1644 in opposition to an elaborate
censorship scheme enacted by the British Parliament the previous year.
8 2
Milton excoriated speech restrictions, contending that the law should not
"misdoubt her [truth's] strength" but should instead "[1]et her [truth] and
falsehood grapple; [because] who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a
free and open encounter?"83 Almost a century and a half later, Immanuel
Kant helped export proto-marketplace of ideas thought to the lecterns of
continental philosophy by obliging people to engage in uninhibited social
expression in their capacity as public citizens even while bearing a
concomitant duty of docility when functioning in their role as private
citizens. 84 He saw the advent of true enlightenment as stultified by "self-
imposed... immaturity... the inability to use one's understanding
without guidance from another., 85  According to Kant, a necessary
condition for unleashing enlightenment from the manacles of immaturity
and dependency is independent, uninhibited expression. He bemoans a
regime where only a "few of the entrenched guardians think for
themselves." Kant conceives of only one remedy for such societies that are
bereft of sound governance and impoverished in intellect, saying "[n]othing
is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the
freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use
reason publicly in all matters. 8 6
While luminaries such as Milton and Kant cultivated a theoretical
landscape fertile for the blossoming of a more formal conception of the
marketplace of ideas, John Stuart Mill in ON LIBERTY succeeded in
infusing it with greater substance and in nurturing it to the point that it
began to enjoy pervasive currency among academics, jurists, and
82. Sid Parkinson, Introduction to excerpts from JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA,
http://www.stlawrenceinstitute.org/voll4mit.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
83. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, in THE PORTABLE MILTON 199
(Douglas Bush ed., The Viking Portable Library 1949) (1644).
84. While Kant is typically associated with the liberty theory of free speech, a plain
reading of his essay reveals that he also advocated the promotion of conditions favorable to
free speech because they invite the proliferation of ideas and enrich humankind. For
example, he says, "[tihe public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can
bring about enlightenment among mankind," indicating that expression not only bears
intrinsic value due to the fact that it enlightens the individual, but it also possesses utilitarian
worth in that it illuminates all of civilization. IMMANUEL KANT, AN ANSWER TO THE
QUESTION: WHAT iS ENLIGHTENMENT? 42 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett 1983) (1784)
(emphasis added).
85. Id at 41.
86. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
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statesmen.17 Mill provides three primary justifications for free speech that
have oft been cited in law journals and judicial opinions. First, Mill asserts
that expressions of opinions, even heretical ones, should not be stifled lest
society risk bartering truth for falsehood in the event that they are true.88
Secondly, even if an opinion is false, it will frequently possess at least a
modicum of truth, which may be only unearthed if it benefits from open
discourse. 89 Third, truthful opinions will be bolstered if they are "earnestly
contested" against falsehood, but will be "enfeebled" and relegated to
"dogma" when opposing ideas are constrained from competing with them. 90
Mill contemplated speech as being virtually an absolute right. He
says, "if all of mankind minus one, were of one opinion... mankind would
be no more justified in silencing that one opinion, than he, if he had the
power, would be justified in silencing mankind." 91 His obdurate advocacy
of free speech was informed by his beliefs that truth can often be embodied
in minority views, and that it may only assume hegemony over falsehood if
it is afforded the opportunity to vitiate the latter through unfettered debate
and a forum for collision with it. Accordingly, Mill championed the
protection of both the dissenting voice and the unpopular sentiment. For
example, he suggests that if society can only provide a finite amount of
protection for expression, it would be preferable for it to insulate heresy,
infidelity, or heterodoxy rather than religion, faithfulness, or orthodoxy. 92
Mill's conception of the marketplace of ideas was subsequently echoed and
touted by preeminent American political theorists who employed it to place
free speech at the beacon of American democracy. John Rawls, despite
acknowledging the theory's shortcomings, maintained that free speech is
"necessary if political affairs are to be conducted in a rational fashion." 93
Robert Dahl also emphasized the importance of robust discourse as he
establishes as a precondition for democracy, the ability for anyone who
"perceives a set of alternatives" preferable to any of the "alternatives
presently scheduled" to express them prior to voting. 94
B. Judicial Application of Marketplace of Idea Theory
The importance of Mill's exposition of the marketplace of ideas is
evinced by its frequent application and appearance in Supreme Court
opinions. In fact, it has become the putative foundation for First
87. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (John Gray ed., Oxford U.P. 1991) (1859).
88. Id. at 59.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at21.
92. Id. at61.
93. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 197 (1971).
94. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 70 (1956).
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Amendment free speech jurisprudence ever since Justices Holmes and
Brandeis commenced to apply it to oppose and jettison restrictions on
speech. In dissenting against a majority that sustained a conviction under
the 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act for distributing leaflets critical
of the deployment of American Marines to Siberia, Holmes exclaimed,
"[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death.
95
According to Holmes, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market., 96 Justice Brandeis
adopted Holmes' marketplace metaphor in Whitney, saying that the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act was unconstitutional because it was
tantamount to "silence coerced by law," while democracy perseveres only
through the prevalence of the "power of reason as applied through public
discussion., 97  The Holmes-Brandeis approach experienced frequent
iteration in Supreme Court cases, as many landmark First Amendment
cases repeatedly adopted its reasoning to expand expressive rights. 98
Perhaps even more salient to the inquiry regarding collateral
censorship is an analysis of the circumstances in which the marketplace of
ideas advocates speech limitations. Even though Mill erected a framework
for justifying a broad speech right, he also expressed consternation for
types of speech that have the potential to debilitate or corrupt the
marketplace of ideas. For example, he was alarmed by the prospect of a
speaker exploiting the marketplace by knowingly proliferating falsehoods
through arguing "sophistically," deliberately contorting facts, or
misrepresenting an opposing opinion.99  Yet, he begrudgingly felt
compelled to oppose any legal measures against such abuses since he saw
attempts to distinguish good faith exercises of specious argumentation from
malicious ones as impracticable.' 00 In addition, he lamented the frequent
expression of intimidating, stigmatizing, or ad hominem speech, but
asserted that offsetting the evils of such expression was solely within the
province of opinion and wholly beyond that of law. 10'
95. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
98. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (determining that flag burning is
protected expression); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (extending First Amendment protection to commercial
speech); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)
(ruling that the government could not suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers since
a broad press right is indispensable for adequately informing the American citizenry); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding that obscenity is proscribable because it
contributes little to the marketplace of ideas).
99. MILL, supra note 87, at 60.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 60-61.
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Even though Mill did not contemplate government regulation for these
modes of speech, his uneasiness with them later tacitly informed some of
the occasions where American courts have exacted speech regulations. The
conditions that precipitate these regulations also represent paradigms for
additional circumstances where new restrictions on speech should be
normatively imposed. Accordingly, the parameters of speech rights that
courts derived through interpreting the marketplace of ideas are apt
crucibles for discerning whether hostile work environment law and
collateral censorship pass constitutional muster. Such evaluation can be
accomplished by assessing the disfavored elements of examples of
proscribable speech under the lens of marketplace of ideas theory and
evaluating whether hostile work environment law and collateral censorship
share any of these features.
1. Clear and Present Danger
Brandenburg remains the bedrock of current clear and present danger
doctrine and represents a paradigmatic use of marketplace of ideas theory
to gerrymander the contours of the First Amendment.'0 2 In Brandenburg, a
Ku Klux Klan leader challenged his conviction stemming from an Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute that forbade "'advocat[ing] .... the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime.., as means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform."" 3 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and
ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. In doing so, it proscribed
punishing mere "advocacy" and asserted that speech condoning criminal
activity only can be restricted if it is "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
'' 4
Commentators have equated the test set forth in Brandenburg to a
modified version of the Holmes/Brandeis clear and present danger test
evidenced in Abrams and Whitney.'O°  Most importantly, the "present"
prong, which manifests in the form of "imminence" in Brandenburg,
resonates with the marketplace of ideas theory because the marketplace is
most imperiled by speech that leaves no time for a response. Conversely, if
it does provide occasion for rejoinder, the speech does not pose an
insurmountable hazard because its subjection to "reason as applied through
public discussion" will inevitably expose and expiate its evil.'16 Similarly,
the "clarity" prong that Brandenburg purportedly translates into
"likeliness" is also informed by marketplace theory because the purpose of
102. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
103. Id. at 444-45.
104. Id. at 447.
105. BAKER,supra note 10, at 8.
106. Id.
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free speech is to "eliminate error," and suppression is only tolerable if the
existence of error and danger is clear.117 Finally, the intent prong also
comports with marketplace theory because it presupposes that a vibrant
marketplace of ideas designed for promoting truth and dialectical reasoning
is undermined by individuals lacking the desire to function through it, but
who rather aspire to induce behavior that will flout it.'l 8
2. Fighting Words
The influence of the marketplace of ideas is also evident, albeit subtly,
in fighting words doctrine. In Chaplinsky, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute that criminalized the use of "any
offensive, derisive, or annoying word" directed at people lawfully situated
in any place.'0 9 The Court upheld the statute holding that certain words are
of "such slight social value as a step to truth" that they are not entitled to
protection.110 It established offensiveness as the pivotal element of the
crime and declared that offense is determined by an objective standard of
whether "men of common intelligence would understand... [the words as]
likely to cause an average addressee to fight.""' Subsequent cases upheld
Chaplinsky but emphasized that a conviction supported by fighting words
theory also requires that the invective be uttered in the immediate presence
of the addressee."l
2
Scholars attempting to place fighting words doctrine under the sweep
of marketplace of ideas theory are inclined to describe fighting words as
speech that inherently causes harm to the addressee. 113 They contend that
such speech in actuality amounts to conduct in that it is tantamount to
"verbally slap[ping]" the addressee "in the face."'" 4 Justice Scalia even
argues, in dicta, that fighting words, despite their verbal character, are in
107. Id.
108. An obvious shortcoming of the claim that there is a precise overlap between
marketplace theory and Brandenburg is that the Brandenburg opinion is written in the
conjunctive, requiring both intent and clear and present danger, while the marketplace of
ideas theory would seemingly support speech suppression when either element exists.
Earlier opinions, particularly those composed by Holmes and Brandeis, proposed a similar
standard in the disjunctive. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
109. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
110. Id. at 572.
111. Id. at 573.
112. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (defining fighting
words as words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.")
113. See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 337-38 (1970).
114. Arnold H. Loewy, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate in Flag Desecration,
49 N.C. L. REv. 48, 84 (1970-1971).
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fact not speech but rather represent a non-speech mode of communication
comparable to a noisy truck.'15 In the same sense that an approaching noisy
truck audibly communicates a message of imminent peril without actually
amounting to speech, so too do fighting words qualify as communication
despite not constituting bona fide speech. Accordingly, certain words that
are exclaimed in the presence of the intended recipient, and that offend
based on an objective reasonableness standard thwart the marketplace of
ideas because their harmful effect is catalyzed before others have the
opportunity to counter the expression with their own speech or cognitive
response.
The Court's refusal to impose liability under group libel or hostile
audience theories bestows credibility on the view that fighting words
liability is justified by the marketplace metaphor. First, even though the
harms of hostile audience and fighting words at least ostensibly appear
analogous in that they share the propensity to incite violent responses, the
Supreme Court in Terminiello rejects the constitutionality of convictions
under the former." 6 The disparate treatment of the two perhaps evidences
that proscribability turns on whether the speech causes immediate insult
and not on whether it tends to incite violent backlash. Secondly, since the
fury of the audience that ensued in Terminiello was primarily galvanized by
the speaker's use of racial epithets, it seems clear that speech that derides a
group is protected even if that group is immediately present. The
incongruence between speakers that insult whole groups and those that
offend individuals can be explained by the view that individuals are better
able to withstand injury from verbal insult when they are situated among
others who are simultaneously insulted than when they are insulted alone.
If the presumption that individuals are hardier when they are in the midst of
a group of similarly situated people is correct, then it follows that they will
have a superior ability to respond cognitively to hurtful speech than lone
individuals whose response will be compromised by the onset of immediate
harm.
3. Libel
Even though the outcome of libel claims is often controlled by the
status of the defamed, the influence of marketplace of ideas theory remains
discernible in all cases. Sullivan is the controlling case for libel claims
filed by public officials. 17  In Sullivan, the police commissioner of
115. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
116. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (holding no liability for a speaker that
incited an already furious audience by engaging in a racial diatribe since the purpose of the
First Amendment is to "invite dispute").
117. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
[Vol. 8:3
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Montgomery, Alabama, sued The New York Times and four clergymen for
publishing a full page ad containing several accounts, some of which were
untrue, of police complicity in various malfeasances against Martin Luther
King, Jr.1'8 The Supreme Court dismissed the libel claim asserting that
public officials1 9 can only sustain libel actions if they can show "actual
malice," namely the false statement was made with "knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.' 20 The Court's
decision was largely informed by its recognition of the importance of the
press remaining unimpeded in its role of engendering "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate on public issues.'2 '
Gertz later established a less demanding standard for libel claims
brought by private individuals even when the alleged calumny relates to
public issues. 122 In Gertz, an attorney sued the John Birch Society for
publishing an article that falsely accused him of being at the forefront of a
Communist conspiracy to frame a police officer convicted of murdering a
youth. 23 After determining that the plaintiff was not a public figure, the
Court ruled in his favor. It determined that states can punish libel against
private individuals as long as they do not impose strict liability. 24 The
Court reasoned that there is not only a diminished societal interest in the
dissemination of matters germane solely to private individuals, but also that
private individuals, unlike public figures, have not assumed the risk of
defamation since they have not propelled themselves into the range of
public acuity.
25
Sullivan and Gertz were influenced by the marketplace of ideas theory
in both an explicit manner and in a more tacit fashion. The express policy
concern articulated in both decisions is a desire to promote conditions
favorable for untrammeled expression and for the exchange of opinions and
ideas. 126 The rulings endorse a hierarchy of ideas where discussion of
matters of public concern, such as those that pertain to public figures, is
accorded more protection than that of mere private interest. 27 In addition,
118. Id. at 257.
119. The standard was subsequently expanded to include public figures. Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1975).
120. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
121. Id. at 270.
122. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
123. Id. at 325-26.
124. Id. at 347.
125. Id. at 345.
126. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
127. Compare Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 (describing that for a public official to recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood, actual malice must be proven. It is not enough to
prove the statement is false.) with Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (noting that states may define
standards for evaluating liability for a defamatory statement made about private
individuals).
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as in the cases of clear and present danger and fighting words, the Court's
consideration of assumption of risk 28 perhaps reflects concerns with the
immediacy of harm and the ability to wage cognitive responses to insult.
Whereas a public figure presumably can respond to public insult with
greater ease by virtue of the fact that she often has ample access to media
fora, private individuals frequently lack the same access to channels of
publicity and, therefore, often endure the harms of libel without benefiting
from the same opportunities to issue a robust publicized response.
The effects of the marketplace metaphor in governing libel doctrine
are also identifiable on an interstitial level. Mill forewarned that the
intentional perpetuation of falsehood is inimical to the viability of the
marketplace even though inadvertently doing the same enhances it.1
29
Accordingly, it is particularly egregious to propagate lies about private
individuals especially when assuming that they lack potent avenues for
response since such prevaricated expression indelibly pollutes the arteries
of the ideational market with falsity. Therefore, as a safeguard against the
prospect of an individual immutably tainting the marketplace, the Court
exacts a broader standard encompassing both reckless and negligent
falsehood. 13 Conversely, under the assumption that a public figure has
more resources to extricate himself from the distortions of false speech, the
Court is less concerned that the marketplace of ideas will suffer irreparable
injury when lies are directed against public figures and thus only permits
liability against those that undermine the marketplace of ideas by
knowingly or recklessly imbuing it with falsehood. 3 '
128. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (stating that public officials expose themselves to a
higher risk of defamatory falsehood).
129. MILL, supra note 87, at 60.
130. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (explaining that states have room to define liability for
defamatory statements about private individuals).
131. But see BAKER, supra note 10, at 10-11. Those contending that the marketplace of
ideas primarily protects cognitive speech that pertains to public and social matters may
disagree with this analysis. They would argue that the narrower standard applies to public
issues because the marketplace of ideas primarily wants to encourage discourse related to
public matters. This reading is in fact more consistent with the facial language of the libel
decisions. However, the purpose of this Comment is to determine whether collateral
censorship is consistent with the broadest application of the marketplace of ideas, which
advocates protection of all types of communicative expression even if they have a scintilla
of social importance. It seems at the very least debatable that many acts of expression
pertaining to private individuals would satisfy this meager standard. Case law frequently
supports the broader understanding of the marketplace of ideas. See, e.g., Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (asserting that all "ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance ... have the full protection of the guaranties" of the First
Amendment) (emphasis added).
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4. Obscenity
The constitutional power to suppress obscene expression also
predominantly arises from a marketplace of ideas rationale. In Roth,
Justice Brennan declared that obscene speech can be proscribed.'32 He
reasoned that obscenity is outside the ambit of the First Amendment
because it is "utterly without redeeming social importance."'
33
Subsequently, in Miller, the Court provided the current doctrine for
defining obscenity. 134 First, in order to amount to obscenity, expressive
material when taken as a whole, from the perspective of contemporary
community standards, "appeal[s] to the prurient interest."' 35 Secondly, the
work depicts sex in a "patently offensive way.' 3 6 Finally, the work as a
whole lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'
137
The imprimatur of marketplace of ideas theory is clearly evident in the
tapestry weaved by the Supreme Court to define obscenity. The Court
establishes numerous safeguards to avoid branding expression that
contributes to the advancement of truth as obscene. Significantly, it
requires that a work be regarded in its totality in order to prevent an
offensive component from tainting an otherwise valuable conduit of
expression. 38 In addition, the case uses a peculiar community standard
139
in order to promote greater precision for the objective inquiry and to in
effect militate against perfunctory curtailment of speech. Moreover, the
Court devises an aegis for types of expression that are particularly favored
by the marketplace of ideas by enumerating expressive topics that are
inordinately susceptible to being erroneously conflated with obscenity.
140
Finally, a more remote application of the marketplace of ideas is the
implied view that obscenity may be inherently antagonistic to the ultimate
objectives of free speech since it attenuates one's desire to engage in
profound and recondite thought, and instead induces him to wallow in that
which is base and profligate.
4. Summary of Judicial Application
In sum, the marketplace of ideas advocates the protection of
communicative expression unless it is marred by one of several
132. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
133. Id. at 484.
134. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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deficiencies. First, it abandons expression that yields an imminent and
defined harm without affording opportunity for cognitive response.
141
Secondly, the marketplace metaphor is inhospitable to speech that is
inherently injurious to an addressee especially when the injured party is
subjected to the speech as an individual. 142  Third, it does not sanction
expression that attempts to use the marketplace instrumentally through
either exploiting its openness in order to disseminate falsehood 143 or
through transmitting ideas that induce immediate visceral, non-verbal
reactions.'" Finally, the marketplace of ideas is belligerent to speech that
is inimical to the promotion of its preferred ends by virtue of the fact that
such speech corrodes and besmirches marketplace channels or lures
individuals away from more socially desirable modes of communication
and thought. 1
45
While it is essential to demarcate the types of speech that are forsaken
by the marketplace of ideas, it is of equal importance to recapitulate some
of the bulwarks that marketplace theory raises in order to prevent the sweep
of regulation from also subsuming desirable speech. First, in the case of
clear and present danger, the Supreme Court requires that the expression
both afford scant occasion for a response and represents a deliberate effort
to vitiate the efficacy of the marketplace. 146 Secondly, the fighting words
doctrine is cautious in its efforts to narrow the category of speech that
results in automatic injury to an addressee by necessitating that it actually
be expressed in the context of a personal encounter and by insisting that the
addressee be an individual. 147 Third, for libel, the Supreme Court heavily
weighs the importance of the speech as well as the target's status and role
in exposing himself to the speech.'" Finally, the existence of obscenity
141. BAKER, supra note 10, at 9.
142. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (discussing
certain types of speech, such as fighting words, that can be proscribed without offending the
Constitution).
143. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (stating that good
faith speech is privileged).
144. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force ... except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action.").
145. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 476 (1957).
146. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
147. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73 (establishing fighting words as a proscribable
category of speech); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (emphasizing
that fighting words produce immediate injury or result in an immediate breach of the peace);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (suggesting that derisive speech only qualifies
as fighting words if it is asserted face-to-face with the addressee); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (reversing the conviction of a speaker whose antagonistic speech was
directed at a group).
148. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (distinguishing speech
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elements is trumped when the attributes of highly valued forms of speech,
such as scientific, political, artistic, or literary speech, are also present. 49
C. Marketplace of Ideas and Collateral Censorship
On the surface, some of the speech that expectedly falls under the
thrust of hostile work environment regulation and collateral censorship
appears to resemble expression that either causes immediate injury or that
engenders an effect before its recipient can proffer a cognitive response.
For example, unsought sexual advances or racial slurs appear comparable
to fighting words in that they tend to instantly injure a recipient and would
likely induce an addressee to react in a negative manner. Moreover, racial,
ethnic, or national vituperations may in fact impel the common addressee
to respond violently, whereas gratuitous sexual comments may produce
immediate obloquy, discomfort, and withdrawal. Furthermore, the evils of
these acts are seemingly exacerbated in the context of the workplace
because the exigencies of the need to earn a living may compel employees
to acquiesce in enduring workplace abuses. 5° In addition, individuals in
the workplace may be more likely than the rest of population to either
experience a sense of helplessness in the face of harassment or to become
inured to offense because the workplace is the main context where adults
feel obliged to be complacent toward being subjected to the control and
authority of others. 5 ' Also, the same conceptual evil that inspires the
marketplace of ideas to withhold protection from speech that clearly
encourages the immediate commission of dangerous acts may also be
manifest in the context of workplace harassment. Just as the speech that
Brandenburg renders proscribable is undesirable because it flouts the
marketplace of ideas by vitiating the potential of responsive speech, so
does workplace harassment diminish the likelihood of response by
affecting employees who as a class often feel compelled to be subordinate,
docile, and even obsequious when in the workplace.
1. Overbreadth of Collateral Censorship
Ostensibly, collateral censorship appears consistent with marketplace
of ideas theory. There is an undeniable nexus between the evils
engendered by harassment and those yielded by the types of speech
addressed in both Brandenburg and Chaplinsky. However, in sharp
contrast to collateral censorship regimes, judicial interpretations of
directed at private individuals from speech that is directed at public officials).
149. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
150. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2314.
151. Id. at2312.
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marketplace of ideas theory seldom tolerate anything other than surgical
speech regulations. Unlike collateral censorship, which is dramatically
overinclusive in its curtailment of speech, clear and present danger and
fighting words doctrine are parsimonious and even underinclusive. In
terms of fighting words, it is conceivable that types of speech other than
those that are uttered in the immediate presence of a lone addressee can
result in instant injury and incite a reasonable person to fight. Similarly,
the Brandenburg standard, by conjunctively requiring intent, likeliness, and
clarity of harm, leaves insulated from liability a lot of odious speech that
can produce immediate harm without opportunity for an ideational
response. Conversely, collateral censorship is prophylactic and clumsy,
reining in, often by fiat, any type of speech that can remotely contribute in
a piecemeal manner to a hostile work environment without regard to the
likelihood of such eventuating. Unlike collateral censorship, which is
necessarily broad and largely indiscriminate as a result of an employer's
fear of vicarious liability, judicial applications of marketplace of ideas
theory seem to prefer absorbing many of the risks inherent to broad
expressive rights over substantially diminishing them by exacting robust
speech restrictions.
The claim that collateral censorship is similar to the marketplace of
ideas' treatment of libel is also flawed. Whereas courts have established
virtually talismanic tests for determining whether a libel claim is valid,
collateral censorship subjects speech to an elaborate set of undiscerning
restrictions that are marked with many trappings apposite for an Orwellian
regime. While a harasser clearly does use speech instrumentally to exploit
his victims, workplace censorship is only an effective precaution against
vicarious liability if it encompasses all expression that can conceivably
promote a hostile environment regardless of whether it is opportunistic or
genuine.
Finally, obscenity is also a deficient paragon for validating collateral
censorship under marketplace of ideas theory. As in the case of fighting
words, the court labels obscenity as expression that is "without redeeming
social importance."'1 2 While the putative absence of social importance is
definitional for obscenity, much of the speech suppressed by collateral
censorship is, conversely, akin to the types of expression that are ascribed
the utmost social worth by contemporary societal standards. For example,
a rational collateral censorship regime would ban many representations of
artistic masterpieces as well as a broad litany of political expression. In
fact, many would contend that these modes of expression are of paramount
importance in fostering the overarching aim of the marketplace of ideas,
which ultimately aspires to herald a "clearer perception and livelier
152. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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impression of truth."' 53 Hence, it follows that the theory is particularly
antagonistic to devices that haphazardly or capriciously truncate these
modes of expression in the workplace, which is the context that arguably
envelopes the preponderance of qualitative expressive opportunities that
exist for many Americans. 114 Since the majority of an individual's time
awake is subsumed by the workday and because work hours often entirely
overlap with the times of day that are usually most ripe for political, social,
civic, and artistic expression, the pervasion of robust workplace censorship
regimes rents a gaping chasm in many of the avenues necessary for arriving
at truth.
2. Prospective Nature of Collateral Censorship
Whereas it is clear that there is an analogical gulf distancing collateral
censorship from the proscribable speech categories adopted by the Supreme
Court, a more incisive critique of collateral censorship contends that its
very nature is inherently inimical to the values and objectives of a vibrant
marketplace of ideas. While all of the proscribable categories restrict
speech retroactively, collateral censorship does so prospectively. 155
Effective corporate harassment policies tend to be vague due to the
ambiguity and breadth of hostile work environment doctrine. Due to the
vagueness that typifies harassment policies, employers often have the
power to determine even after speech has already been communicated that
it violates the policy and warrants disciplinary sanctions. The fact that the
policy had not adequately alerted the employee that the speech could
qualify as harassment does not exculpate him. Moreover, unlike courts,
which meticulously analyze the elements of an offense and attempt to
adjudge whether alleged expressive conduct satisfies these elements,
collateral censorship indiscriminately proscribes and penalizes expression
without carefully evaluating whether it is of either a particular nature or
degree. Further, employers, unlike judges, do not benefit from the virtual
omniscience of hindsight or from the peace of the serene judicial chamber
153. MILL, supra note 87, at 21.
154. See Estlund, supra note 59, at 733 ("For many people, there is no other time or
place in their lives [other than the workplace] in which they can talk about public issues,
personal problems, and spiritual concerns with individuals from diverse backgrounds and
perspectives.").
155. Unlike the proscribable categories that are articulated clearly by the legislature and
that are constitutionally required to steer clear of vagueness, employers often receive little
guidance from harassment policies in deciding if speech qualifies as harassment and often
must make such determinations in an ad hoc manner. See supra note 61 (providing an
example of a catch-all phrase that affords employers much latitude in deciding whether
speech violates the company policy but leaves employees with no meaningful guidelines for
being able to predict what types of expression contravene the policy).
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since their security from imputed liability depends more on their preventing
harmful expression from ever occurring than on their providing a remedy
once it has already eventuated. Therefore, hostile work environment law
precludes the application of the type of deliberative analysis espoused and
practiced by courts attempting to effectuate the marketplace of ideas and
instead compels employers to impulsively suppress an extravagant array of
speech. Ultimately, prospective speech restrictions of this ilk have been
frequently criticized by the Supreme Court, which has said that "a free
society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.,
156
3. Prior Restraints and Collateral Censorship
Collateral censorship, in light of its prospective nature and some of its
other harsh attributes, is conceptually akin to the unconstitutional excesses
that characterize prior restraints. Prior restraints, which have been
denounced as "the essence of censorship," '57 typically refer to speech
restrictions that arise from judicial injunctions or arbitrary licensing
schemes. 5 8 One evil associated with prior restraints is that it is antithetical
to a democratic society that prides itself on the existence of a broad speech
right to permit a form of speech restriction that necessarily depends on the
existence of an elaborate censorship scheme. 159 A more insidious harm
salient to prior restraints corresponds to their inherent appeal to judges
deciding difficult cases where issuing a verdict favorable to speech may
precipitate a substantial societal harm.1 60  Under such demanding
circumstances, judges are instinctively prompted to suppress speech rather
than to protect it and risk bearing responsibility for inviting its evils.
1 61
Justice Holmes succinctly iterates the insidious appeal of prior restraints,
156. Vance v. Universal Amusement, Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980).
157. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
158. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) ("The term 'prior restraint' is
used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur."' (quoting
MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, §4.03, 4-14 (1984))). See New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting the imposition of a judicial
injunction to enjoin the publication of the Pentagon Papers); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down a licensing scheme for leafleting on public streets).
159. See EMERSON, supra note 113, at 506 (asserting that prior restraints, like all forms
of censorship, subject a broader range of expression to scrutiny, increase the likelihood of
suppression, and drive the speech regulation system toward excesses).
160. C. Edwin Baker, Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.,
Lecture on Prior Restraints for Fall 2004 Free Speech/First Amendment Course (Nov. 3,
2004).
161. See Vance, 445 U.S. at 316 n.13 (stating that the "risks of freewheeling censorship
is formidable" in regimes that allow prior restraints).
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saying the impulse to censor is a natural one: "If you have no doubt of
your premises or your power and want a certain result ... you naturally
express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition."'
162
The mentality that Holmes derides in his pithy statement is
exemplified by Progressive. In Progressive, a district court had to decide
whether to enjoin the publication of an article entitled: "The H-Bomb
Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It.,' 163 Both the State Depart-
ment and the Pentagon submitted briefs alleging that the publication of the
article would severely compromise national security and would materially
facilitate thermonuclear proliferation. 64  The district court issued an
injunction. Its decision was heavily influenced by the belief that it was
making a "stark choice between upholding the right to continued life and
the right to freedom of the press.' 65 It asserted that a "mistake in ruling
against [the expressive interest] will seriously infringe cherished First
Amendment rights.... A mistake in ruling against the United States could
,,166pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation .... Despite the incontro-
vertible exigencies surrounding the legal issues in Progressive, it is clear
that broad use of its reasoning would eviscerate the marketplace of ideas by
serving as a mechanism for placing a moratorium on dissenting or
controversial expression.
Collateral censorship functions in a nearly identical manner to prior
restraints and is motivated by a very similar impulse. The allure of both
censorships emanates from the fear of both the employer and the judge that
they will suffer backlash if they opt to protect speech that later proves to be
harmful. Furthermore, they each exploit a psychological urge that compels
individuals to pursue blame-avoiding mechanisms. The result of both is
that dissenting or unconventional voices, which are most likely to evoke
the aforementioned psychological concerns because their effects are often
largely unexplored, inevitably suffer inordinate suppression. Thus, since
the veins of expression that are most indispensable for a vivacious
marketplace of ideas are frequently abrogated, prior restraints and collateral
censorship serve to entrench the status quo and stultify discourse that can
lead to the discovery of new truths. Nevertheless, despite their similarities,
collateral censorship may be even more oppressive to the marketplace of
ideas than prior restraints. Due to the fact that employers that fail to
suppress harmful expression face legal liability and financial loss while
judges merely confront the potential of a marred reputation and ignominy,
162. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
163. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(preliminary injunction issued Mar. 28, 1979).
164. Id. at 991-92.
165. Id. at 995.
166. Id. at 996.
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it seems clear that the material costs of failing to institute a robust
collateral censorship regime may be considered more severe than the
intangible costs of not imposing a prior restraint. Therefore, because the
costs of failing to collaterally censor are, on at least one level, higher than
the costs of not issuing prior restraints, the first is likely to occur more
frequently and more forcefully than the latter. Accordingly, it can be
argued that collateral censorship is a greater and more pervasive threat to
the marketplace of ideas than the notorious prior restraint.
4. Time, Place, or Manner Regulations and Collateral Censorship
Proponents of hostile work environment doctrine may argue that
despite collateral censorship's belligerence toward speech, it can be
justified under the marketplace of ideas theory as a legitimate time, place,
or manner regulation. This position would contend that collateral
censorship is constitutional since it only restricts speech in the workplace
but imposes no limitations on employees when they are not at work. This
view is untenable for two reasons. First, time, place, or manner regulations
have typically passed constitutional muster only when they manifest as
legislative enactments, 167 but not when they function in a manner similar to
prior restraints, which are subject to strict scrutiny requiring both
"compelling public need and surgical precision of restraint. , 168 Thus,even
though hostile work environment doctrine alone can be arguably treated as
a time, place, or manner regulation, the pastiche of speech limitations that
results from the inevitable influence of collateral censorship are markedly
dissimilar from most extant constitutional time, place, or manner
regulations.
Secondly, collateral censorship would not satisfy the time, place, or
manner regulation test set forth by the Supreme Court even if, arguendo, it
were to only undergo intermediate scrutiny. Under current doctrine, to
avoid a presumption of unconstitutionality, legislation regulating the time,
place, or manner of expressive activity must be justified without reference
to the content of the speech, be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and must "leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.' 69 Setting aside the initial two prongs,
collateral censorship typically deprives employees of "ample alternative"
167. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994) (denying that a
court injunction that restricted anti-abortion protests within a thirty-six foot buffer zone was
a prior restraint because it was in response to prior unlawful conduct and because it only
imposed nominal restrictions on speech and implying that the injunction would, however, be
problematic if it did in fact qualify as a prior restraint).
168. Id. at 798 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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avenues to communicate ideas because it occurs in the context of the
workplace. Due to the length of the ordinary workday and the typical
protracted commute, employees are often deprived of the opportunity to
personally interact with other people in locales other than the workplace.
Therefore, since many forms of communication depend on the presence of
a sizeable audience, the workplace frequently becomes the only context in
which the communication of certain types of expression is practicable.
Consequently, collateral censorship can severely attenuate or even wholly
preclude an employee's ability to engage in certain types of expression.
Not only is this impermissible under time, place, or manner regulation
doctrine, but it also does substantial violence to the core values of the
marketplace of ideas.
IV. HUMAN LIBERTY THEORY
A. Underpinnings of Human Liberty Theory
Human liberty theory focuses on expression's role as an exemplar of
individual autonomy and as a vehicle for self-affirmation. Unlike
marketplace of ideas theory, liberty theory seldom concentrates on the
communicative aspect of speech, but instead champions the protection of
expression even when there is no hope that it will further "the search for
truth. 1 70 Accordingly, liberty theory treats speech not as a mere means for
attaining utilitarian aims, but rather as an exalted and inviolable end in
itself. At the core of the liberty justification for free speech is the claim
that expression is a prime manifestation of all human beings' sovereign
"status as free and rational persons. 17' Professor Baker ties the liberty
rationale for respecting speech to the role it plays in fostering both the self-
actualization of the speaker and her ability to partake in change.172 In a
similar manner to how German philosopher Georg Hegel justified a broad
property right by heralding property ownership as one's corporeal
representation of her inner-self to the lens of the world, 73 liberty theorists
perceive expression as the apotheosis of an individual's inner-self and her
ability to effect change. To effectuate the sovereign individual right to
manifest self, liberty theorists espouse the protection of all expression,
regardless of whether or not it is communicative, as long as it "represents
the freely chosen expression of the speaker, depends for its power on the
free acceptance of the listener, and is not used in the context of a violent or
170. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 9 (1992).
171. Fried, supra note 8, at 233.
172. BAKER, supra note 10, at 69.
173. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40-57 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965) (1844).
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coercive activity."' 74
B. Scope of Human Liberty Theory Speech Right
Juxtaposing the human liberty and marketplace of ideas approaches to
speech implicates many areas where the former espouses broad
constitutional speech rights while the latter is sanguine with withholding
them. These variances have surfaced in both academic literature and in
seminal court decisions. In particular, liberty theory embraces certain
modes of expressive conduct that are devoid of a communicative intent or
effect. For example, liberty theory shelters "interactive verbal activities"
that are conducted without reference to their "semantic content," such as
group chants in a foreign language.'75 It also safeguards solitary expression
not intended to be received by a human audience, such as prayer, keeping a
diary, talking to oneself, and reading pornography. 76
Liberty theory has also surfaced in the context of constitutional
litigation as part of an effort to succor expression that would be regulatable
if First Amendment law were governed solely under the province of
marketplace of ideas theory. In Barnette, the Supreme Court determined
that a student has the right to refrain from saluting the American flag. 177 It
ruled that individuals have a right to be free of measures that invade "the
sphere of intellect and spirit" by compelling them to affirm their belief in
any governmentally mandated position. 78 Even though this right to be free
from compelled expression does not comport neatly with the Court's
conception of communication, the Court determined that coercing a student
to salute would be an affront to his dignity and status as an autonomous and
rational being. 179
Dissenting justices have also frequently employed liberty theory in an
attempt to harness emotive expression firmly under the ambit of the First
Amendment. Denying that the Constitution only shields ideational or
cognitive expression, Justice Douglas asserted that expression that solely
has "value to the masochistic community or to others of the deviant
community" should be insulated from regulation. 80 The nub of Douglas'
position is that even expression that is completely visceral and that only
appeals to the marginal elements of society should enjoy constitutional
protection by dint of the fact that it embodies an exertion of their
174. BAKER, supra note 10, at 69.
175. Baker, supra note 81, at 984.
176. Id.
177. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
178. Id. at 642.
179. Id.
180. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 489-90 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8:3
2006] COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP AND FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 801
autonomy. Subsequently, Douglas lamented the majority's unsympathetic
treatment of obscenity, professing that democracy "makes the individual,
not government, the keeper of... [one's] tastes, beliefs, and ideas."''
In a similar vein to how Justice Douglas tried to extricate obscenity
from the chasms of constitutional opprobrium, Justice Harlan evoked
liberty values to widen the First Amendment to include symbolic speech.
In Cohen, the defendant was convicted under a California disturbing-the-
peace statute for wearing a jacket that bore the words "fuck the draft" in a
courthouse corridor. 18  Harlan concluded that the conviction was
impermissible. Despite also using a marketplace of ideas rationale to
support his holding, he reasoned that the Constitution "leaves matters of
taste and style ... to the individual.' 83  Ultimately, the importance of
Cohen is that it ushers expression that does not easily conform with the
marketplace of ideas paradigm into the sphere of First Amendment rights
by declaring that expressive rights can be predicated on fundamental
human liberty even if the expression is emotive or utterly non
communicative.
C. Limits of the Human Liberty Theory Speech Right
There are also manifold instances where the marketplace of ideas
condones speech protection while liberty theory withholds it. First, due to
the fact that marketplace of ideas theory primarily venerates the
communicative product of expression, it extends its aegis to speech that
engenders a valuable message even when it is communicated by a speaker
subject to duress or outright coercion. In contrast, since an individual's
volition is at the beacon of liberty theory values, human liberty theory only
insulates speech that is willfully expressed by the speaker. Secondly,
unlike the marketplace of ideas school, liberty theorists do not protect
speech even when it emanates from the willful authorship of the speaker if
the speech patently does not constitute self-expression. One prominent
example of such is profit-oriented commercial speech, which Professor
Baker contends may be undeserving of First Amendment sanction because
it "does not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in a way that
has any logical or intrinsic connection to anyone's substantive values or
personal wishes."'8 14  Instead, to liberty theorists, commercial speech
reflects an instrumental use of expression aimed at satisfying the demands
of the economic market,8 5 which require all actors to employ expression in
181. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
182. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15 (1971).
183. Id. at 25.
184. BAKER, supra note 10, at 196.
185. Id.
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a fashion apt for maximizing fiscal profits. Corporate expression that does
not adequately represent the autonomous output of shareholders is also an
example of speech that may be ascribed premium worth by the marketplace
of ideas but is not akin to the type of self expression that merits
constitutional protection under liberty theory.
186
Human liberty theory also withholds protection from expression that
compromises the liberty interests of addressees or others exposed to it. In
some instances expression of this ilk may in fact also be beyond the scope
of the marketplace of ideas; however, it is per se inimical to the
fundamental precepts of liberty theory. This circumscription of the
expressive rights corpus is almost as old as the contemporary conception of
free speech, and its provenance can be traced back to Kant, who set forth in
his categorical imperatives a requirement that each human be treated as "an
end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or
that will." '187 The importance of expression being non-coercive is also a
logical corollary to a speaker benefiting from a regime that respects her
individual autonomy. It would be paradoxical for government to shield a
speaker's expression on the predicate that speech rights inhere to her innate
dignity and status as an autonomous individual but to then condone the
very same speaker's use of expression to derogate or "coercively restrict[]"
the "independence or moral agency"'188 of other equally sovereign
individuals.
There are several modes of expression that purportedly truncate the
will and autonomy of other individuals that may be germane to the speech
restricted by hostile work environment doctrine and collateral censorship.
Fighting words is one potential example. Since fighting words allegedly
subject addressees to immediate injury, they are an intrinsic affront to their
liberty rights because the harm is caused from the words themselves and
not from an addressee's cognitive or rational interpretation of them.189 The
court may have also expressed its concern for fighting words' diminution
of an addressee's autonomy by making fighting words analysis turn on the
objective response of an addressee rather than on subjective analysis. The
fact that the average addressee would react by fighting suggests that
fighting words deprive addressees of their rationality and autonomy by
provoking a monolithic and virtually deterministic violent reaction.
Perhaps related to the fighting words argument is expression that is
intended to intimidate, which was recently branded by the Supreme Court
186. Id. 218-23.
187. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett 3rd ed. 1993) (1785).
188. Baker, supranote 81, at 1019.
189. See id. at 989 (stating that "harm-producing expression does not deserve
constitutional protection").
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as a proscribable category.19 ° One can argue that deliberate intimidation
violates an addressee's liberty by transforming him into a means for
achieving the speaker's will and by interfering with his capacity to
rationally contemplate and react to speech. Another type of expression that
may subvert the liberty interests of addressees is that which falls under
captive audience or unwilling listener doctrine. A final potentially salient
class is speech that can subject a principal or any other individual to
vicarious liability. 191
D. Human Liberty Theory and Collateral Censorship
The primary arguments that hostile work environment doctrine is
consistent with liberty values arise from the claim that the speech it
suppresses is inherently inimical to the liberty interests of others. Less
persuasive is the claim that such speech does not constitute a volitional
self-expressive endeavor. Even though workplace speech often occurs in
the context of a commercial setting, speech that typically qualifies as
harassment is not motivated by the demands of the economic market.
Therefore, the more credible arguments hinge on various strands of the
proposition that expression at loggerheads with the liberty interests of
others may be regulated.
1. Fighting Words and Speech Intended to Intimidate
Ostensibly, it may appear that liberty theory's treatment of both
fighting words and speech with the intent to intimidate is an apt predictor
for the manner in which it would regard workplace speech. However,
closer scrutiny suggests that such an analogy is deficient. First, it is
revealing that courts subject fighting words to only an objective inquiry,
while hostile work environment harassment requires both objective and
subjective analyses. The fact that the sine qua non of fighting words
pertains to how the common person would expectedly react to the speech
implies that the Supreme Court tacitly opined that fighting words have the
effect of eviscerating an addressee's agency and volition. Essentially,
fighting words are inimical to the liberty interest of addressees because
they tend to induce them, almost in a deterministic fashion, to act in a very
predictable, specific manner namely to fight. Conversely, hostile work
environment doctrine does not venture to allege that the speech that it
suppresses inevitably invokes a monolithic reaction but rather puts a lot of
emphasis on the subjective, idiosyncratic response of the addressee.
190. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
191. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2300-02.
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The analogy willows further when considering the fact that fighting
words doctrine encompasses a much narrower array of speech than does
hostile work environment. While the latter includes expression that either
independently or aggregately engenders any degree of offense, the former
is limited to speech that by itself produces offense grave enough to
immediately result in a fight. Thus, the capaciousness of hostile work
environment law indicates that it will subsume a plethora of speech, much
of which may not in fact efface the liberty of addressees. The comparison
with expression intended to intimidate is also marred by a similar
deficiency. While the Black holding is constrained to speech that
deliberately seeks to intimidate and does not extend to speech that merely
has the effect of intimidating, 192 hostile work environment refrains from
engaging in any scienter inquiry whatsoever. Therefore, Black is more
likely than hostile work environment doctrine to limit its purview to speech
that actually impairs the liberty interests of addressees.
2. Captive Audience
The assertion that individuals in a workplace are a captive audience is
ostensibly a more compelling attempt to harmonize hostile work
environment doctrine and collateral censorship with the dictates of liberty
theory. Professor Balkin argues for a reformulation of captive audience
doctrine and attempts to revamp it so that it encompasses hostile work
environments. 93  He contends that courts have erred in traditionally
limiting captive audience doctrine to speech that infiltrates one's home and
maintains that it is better suited for workplace speech. 194 Balkin reasons
that employees are the optimal paradigms of a captive audience since they
are enveloped in the workplace, the context in which adults are "most
subject to the discipline of others and least free to leave."' 95 He further
reasons that the evocation of captive audience doctrine should in principle
not hinge on "geographical places" but should rather pivot on the nature of
the "social relations" in which the expression is framed. 196 Ultimately,
Professor Balkin posits that employers encapsulated in a hostile work
environment are really captive audiences because the fact that they depend
on the workplace for their livelihood effectively bars them from willfully
leaving it. Thus, expression in such a social context is often proscribable
because it impinges upon the liberty rights of employees by virtue of the
fact that it is in effect coercively imposed upon them.
192. Black, 538 U.S. at 347-48.
193. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2310.
194. Id. at 2312.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2314.
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Even though Balkin may be correct that captive audience doctrine
should turn on a social relationship analysis rather than on a geographical
place inquiry, his analysis overlooks a key element of unwilling listener
jurisprudence that is eminently informed by liberty theory.19 7 Captive
audience is a limited doctrine that until recently has been triggered only
after a listener has clearly demonstrated to a speaker that he does not want
to be exposed to the expression. 198 For example, in Martin, the Supreme
Court invalidated a statute that forbade the door to door delivery of
handbills.' 99 The Court determined that the statute would have been
constitutional as a result of unwilling listener doctrine if it had only barred
the dissemination of handbills to a resident that had "appropriately
indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed."2 Similarly, in Lamont, the
Court struck down a federal statute that prohibited the mailing of
Communist propaganda to anyone other than recipients that first requested
its delivery in writing.20 ' Conversely, in Rowan, the Court upheld a statute
that criminalized the act of sending obscene materials to an individual who
had previously expressed to the sender that he did not want to receive it.
202
Thus, the gravamen of unwilling audience doctrine appears to be the
audience's ex ante deliberate and explicit rejection of the expression.20 3
Hostile work environment law, by allowing for aggregation and by not
requiring the plaintiff to first convey to the speaker his ire toward the
speech, is conceptually incompatible with captive audience doctrine. From
a liberty perspective, bootstrapping hostile work environment law to
unwilling listener doctrine represents an obvious affront to the liberty
interests of willing listeners. Due to the fact that aggregation and
indeterminacy with respect to what constitutes harassment compel
employers to collaterally censor and to do so based largely on conjecture
about which types of speech offend, much expression that would be
otherwise desirable to autonomous listeners is paternalistically withheld
from them. Since the workplace, unlike the home, is typically a unit
197. This Comment's treatment of Professor Balkin's approach to captive audience
doctrine and collateral censorship is limited to assessing it against the human liberty theory
of free speech. It is acknowledged that Balkin does not claim that his article conforms with
liberty theory.
198. But see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (applying unwilling listener doctrine
to uphold statute barring people from protesting, educating, and counseling within eight feet
of any person in front of a health care facility unless individuals consent to receiving the
expression).
199. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
200. Id at 148.
201. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
202. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
203. C. Edwin Baker, Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.,
Lecture on Unwilling Listener Doctrine for Fall 2004 Free Speech/First Amendment Course
(Nov. 10, 2004).
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
comprised of an impressive spectrum of heterogeneous convictions and
views, collateral censorship will inevitably, based primarily on speculation,
preclude people from independently opting to receive expression.
Professor Balkin's reformulation of captive audience doctrine is also
unduly inimical to the liberty interests of speakers. Unlike quintessential
examples of a speaker purposely using expression to subvert the will and
autonomy of other individuals, hostile work environment and collateral
censorship suppress speech even when the speaker has absolutely no intent
to infringe the liberty of others. It would seem substantially more
consistent with liberty theory to at least require that the addressee first give
the speaker notice that his speech is unwanted. However, current hostile
work environment doctrine imposes liability even when the speaker had no
viable means for discerning or predicting whether the speech will offend.2 °4
As Kant, one of the forbearers of liberty theory, professed, actors should be
judged solely by the principles that underlie their acts rather than by the
results of their conduct. 20 5 Thus, an actor cannot be said to be intentionally
using a listener as a means rather than an end in itself 06 if the former is
given nothing more than exiguous indication that the speech insults or
denigrates the latter's liberty.
3. Vicarious Liability
A final attempt to establish symbiosis between collateral censorship
and liberty theory arises from the claim that employers are justified in
censoring expression that exposes them to vicarious liability. Professor
Balkin tacitly champions this supposition, saying that collateral censorship
is constitutional when Congress treats "the private censor and the private
speaker as the 'same speaker' for purposes of First Amendment law.
20 7
He says that vicarious liability is justified for hostile work environment
purposes because the censor and the speaker are part of the same harm-
producing enterprise and because the censor is in the best position to
204. This point is buttressed by the earlier discussion of the indeterminacy surrounding
the concept of offense. A speaker is given little guidance in determining what speech
precipitates offense and can therefore unintentionally cause offense to a particular listener
even if the same expression simultaneously delights other members of the audience. See
supra note 33.
205. See KANT, supra note 187, at 26 (stating that the categorical imperative of morality
obliges people not to be "concerned with the matter of action and its intended result, but
rather with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows; what is essentially
good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they
may.").
206. Id. at 35.
207. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2300.
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prevent the harm.2°8 Interstitially embedded in Balkin's conception of
hostile work environments is a conflict of wills and liberties. In essence, he
argues, speakers in this context cannot speak without compromising the
autonomy of the censor because from the vantage of the law, the two are
constructively unified as a singular entity by virtue of the fact that they
share liability. Therefore, employee speech is proscribable because it is
intrinsically detrimental to the liberty and welfare of the vicariously liable
employer. In addition, since the speaker and the censor are coupled into a
single harm-causing enterprise, their wills are also amalgamated from the
perspective of the plaintiff because their union conspires to subvert his
liberty interest.
From a human liberty perspective, Professor Balkin's effort to
inoculate workplace censorship by fusing employee expression in the
workplace with the rights of an employer is unfounded. First, with respect
to liberty theory, it appears circular to argue that collateral censorship is
normatively and constitutionally sound because hostile work environment
law imposes vicarious liability.20 9 Furthermore, to adequately sustain this
proposition, it seems necessary to first establish a sound normative basis
210
for vicarious liability rather than to heavily rely on a prudential one.2 '
More importantly, there does not seem to be justification under liberty
208. Id. at 2301-02.
209. Balkin purports to be resolving the issue of whether hostile work environment law
is constitutional despite collateral censorship. His conclusion that it can be constitutional is
largely predicated on the theory that collateral censorship is valid due to the fact that
employers are induced to collaterally censor by the threat of vicarious liability that can be
imposed on them by hostile work environment law. Due to the fact that Balkin's theory
hinges on the acceptance of the legal effects of hostile work environment law, namely its
ability to engender vicarious liability, it seems that his argument necessarily depends on the
presupposition that hostile work environment law is constitutional, which is the very
proposition that he sets out to prove.
210. Balkin, in fact, attempts to establish a normative basis for vicarious liability in the
context of hostile work environments. He argues that employers benefit from or at least
acquiesce to hostile environments because they help "keep jobs and employment
opportunities sex-segregated according to traditional gender roles," which in turn helps
"avoid labor disputes and preserve esprit de corps and loyalty" among male workers.
Balkin, supra note 4, at 2305. Balkin's concern may justify current hostile work
environment law and collateral censorship if they were limited to targeting modes of
expression that are aimed at or have a strong likelihood of enhancing a patriarchal or
discriminatory climate in the workplace. However, the persuasiveness of his concern is
compromised by virtue of the fact that hostile work environment law, and in particular,
collateral censorship ineluctably suppress a broad array of speech that cannot conceivably
exacerbate the patriarchal milieu of a workplace. See supra notes 11-79 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, it is unclear how Balkin's concern about sex-segregation would justify or
treat the assortment of actionable classes other than sex that have arisen through legislation
or litigation. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
211. One of Balkin's main prudential claims is that the employer is in the best position to
prevent harassment. Id. at 2301.
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theory for asserting that the censor and the speaker are part of the same
harm-causing enterprise or are a conflated legal personality any time that an
employee engages in expression in the workplace. Instead, such merger
only truly results when the employee's expression pertains to the goals of
the business association as opposed to when it primarily relates to personal
or other non business related interests. Only when speech is expressed
within the scope of the very purposes of the organization does it reflect and
implicate the interests and rights of employers because it is mainly in this
context that employers and employees instrumentally shape their ambitions
and aspirations to accomplish shared ends dictated by the economic market.
Conversely, when an employee's speech relates to personal interests, it is
solely a reflection of his inner autonomous self and not an embodiment of
the capital market-induced opportunistic interest in pecuniary gain, which
he shares and pursues with his employer. Furthermore, from a prudential
perspective, it is primarily in the context of speech related to the business
association that employers can predict and surgically prevent undesirable
conduct. However, when expression is unrelated to the purposes of the
business association, it lacks a material nexus to the interests and
aspirations of the employer and only relates to them superficially by virtue
of the fact that it happened to be uttered in the workplace.
The examples provided by Balkin to support his endorsement of
collateral censorship in fact militate for the obverse claim that the vicarious
liability justification for collateral censorship is at best only warranted
when employee speech pertains to the purposes of the business association.
For example, Balkin compares hostile work environment to the vicarious
liability and censorship incentives that induce publishers and editors to
chill the speech of reporters out of fear of incurring vicarious libel
liability.212 The newspaper example is markedly distinguishable from the
case of an employer who makes an employee remove a reproduction of
Michelangelo's David from his cubicle due to hostile environment
concerns. Whereas the reporter's expression is conducted primarily as an
attempt to foster the objectives of the newspaper, the art was posted as a
representation of the employee's autonomous individual expression.
Similarly, Balkin also provides an example of book publishers who censor
book manuscripts to circumvent problems of defamation, fraud, or
copyright infringement.213 Again, the expression that is being censored,
namely the content of the book, is a profit making mechanism for the
enterprise, while an employee's blasd joke is an example of personal
expression. A final illustration proffered by Balkin is corporate censorship
of misleading statements with respect to company profits made by
212. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2299-2300.
213. Id. at 2301-02.
[Vol. 8:3
2006] COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP AND FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 809
employees that can potentially evoke federal securities liability.2 14 This
example also fails to support Balkin's broad rule due to the fact that
statements on company earnings are clearly within the ambit of expression
pertaining to the profits and function of the business association and are not
within the scope of genuine autonomous expression reflecting an
employee's inner-self. In sum, analysis of Balkin's examples ultimately
demonstrate that his scope of employment standard focuses excessively on
the superficial considerations of whether speech occurs within the
workplace or during work hours and too little on the more incisive inquiry
of whether the speech truly represents a merger of the liberty interests of
the employer and employee.
4. Summary of Human Liberty Theory and Collateral Censorship
Ultimately, human liberty theory does not support the constitutionality
of hostile work environment when considering the problem of collateral
censorship. First, there is no sound argument buttressing the notion that the
speech that typically succumbs to collateral censorship is divorced from the
self-actualization efforts of the speaker. Secondly, there are also
inadequate grounds for alleging that a broad spectrum of the types of
speech quashed by collateral censorship are inherently inimical to the
liberty interests of addressees. For instance, analogizing fighting words
and hostile work environment seems unwarranted because unlike the
former, the latter does not purport to quell speech that evokes a monolithic
and virtually predetermined reaction. Additionally, since hostile work
environment doctrine does not require that a listener first object to
expression before it is rendered proscribable, it does not seem to resonate
with the liberty principles embodied in the captive audience doctrine.
Finally, since a large quantum of the expression curtailed by collateral
censorship is unrelated to the purposes and goals of the business
association, using the existence of vicarious liability as a touchstone for
determining when collateral censorship is defensible seems antithetical to
liberty values.
V. EPIPHENOMENAL ANALYSIS
The fact that hostile work environment doctrine, largely as a result of
collateral censorship, falters under the scrutiny of the two predominant
theories of free speech does not foreclose argumentation supporting its
constitutionality. Those inclined to favor government regulation for the
purpose of redressing systemic societal inequities have at their disposal a
214. Id. at 2301.
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variety of alternative theories advocating the curtailment of liberties and
rights in the event that their aggregate effects yield unbearable evils.
Scholars and, in a more tempered manner, judges, have specifically
criticized the epiphenomenal results of both the marketplace of ideas and
individual liberty theories and have proposed various remedies that may
provide justification for the stringencies of hostile work environment
doctrine. These theorists have largely focused on the nefarious role that
both the marketplace of ideas and the individual liberty theory often play in
spurring inequality and in ossifying inequitable status quos.
A. Market Failure
Market failure is an example of a theory that tries to ameliorate some
of the adverse effects of the marketplace of ideas. The market failure
theory postulates that in the same manner that government intervention
may be necessary to offset some of the undesirable, invidious effects of a
laissez-faire economy so too is regulation justifiable to countervail harms
arising from the marketplace of ideas.215 It is typically implicated when
ideas in the marketplace are monopolized by actors that enjoy greater
access to channels of communication or when individuals or groups
struggle to access the marketplace as a result of collective action
problems.1 6 It can be argued that the same conceptual difficulties that
justify regulation under the paradigmatic conditions of market failure are
also evident in the context of the workplace. The workplace is, as Balkin
notes, the locale where adults feel most consigned to reticence and docility,
since confronting abuses may jeopardize their livelihood and social
status.21  Accordingly, the workplace environment is ripe for collective
action problems because despite rampant and endemic abuses, few
employees would incur the risks that are inherent to expressing the
propriety of and necessity for reform. In addition, since employers likely
enjoy greater access to the channels of communication in the workplace, it
seems that without ameliorative regulations such as hostile work
environment doctrine, they will succeed in overshadowing the gallantry
and mettle of the few dissident employees that do venture to voice
grievances.
B. Liberty, Equality, and Regulation
Like market failure theorists, liberty theorists also lament the tension
that exists between individual liberties and societal equality and often
215. BAKER, supra note 10, at 37.
216. Id.
217. Balkin, supra note 4, at 2310.
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advocate regulations that sacrifice some liberty in exchange for narrowing
social disparities and negating inequities. John Rawls, in the context of
voting and legislation, bemoans the fact that governmental respect for
individual liberties can allow those with "greater private means ... to use
their advantage to control the course of public debate. 218 He therefore
recommends that "compensating steps ... be taken to preserve the fair
value for all of the equal political liberties. 219 Isaiah Berlin echoes this
proposition, asserting "the extent of a man's, or a people's liberty to choose
to live as they desire must be weighed against the claims of many other
values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness... are perhaps the most
obvious examples. For this reason it [liberty] cannot be unlimited.,
22
1
Thus, even the most passionate champions of individual liberty recognize
the tension between liberty and equality and insist that some liberty must
occasionally succumb to government regulation in the event that it
functions to the detriment of equality.
C. Judicial Response to Child Pornography
The court's treatment of child pornography, which represents an
instance where judges concluded that uninhibited expressive rights can
yield intolerable societal harms, may also provide fodder for proponents of
hostile work environment doctrine. In Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a
conviction of a seller of films depicting child masturbation.221 The Court
determined that states can proscribe the production and dissemination of
visual material, not otherwise obscene, that depicts sexual conduct by
children even if it does not appeal to the prurient interest, portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive fashion, and is not viewed as a work as
whole.222 The Court justified its conclusion on the grounds that preventing
the sexual exploitation of children is a "government objective of surpassing
importance" and that the distribution of these materials is "intrinsically
related to the abuse of children., 223  The Court in Osborne further
augmented regulatory powers by allowing states to bar the possession of
child pornography.224
The suppression of child pornography is particularly important
because it seems not entirely consistent with either marketplace of ideas or
liberty values. First, the Court uncharacteristically makes no reference to
218. RAWLS, supra note 93, at 198.
219. Id.
220. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 118, 170
(1969).
221. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
222. Id. at 761.
223. Id. at 758-59.
224. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
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the materials not contributing to societal progress. In fact, the Court
implicitly concedes that such materials can have social worth but yet
determines that the interest in protecting children transcends any potential
societal value that these materials possess. This is epitomized by the fact
that the Court in its ultimate holding in Ferber does not provide a safe
harbor for works that have scientific, literary, political, or artistic value as it
had done in the obscenity cases.225  In addition, the law on child
pornography does not comport well with liberty interests. Their
incongruence is exemplified by Osborne, which allows the prohibition of
mere possession of child pornography.2 26 It would be difficult to argue that
mere possession is inimical in any direct manner to the liberty interests of
other individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, even though the liberty and marketplace of ideas theories
do not justify collateral censorship, there are, when considering the
systemic problems engendered by speech in the workplace, several
alternative theories and arguments that support hostile work environment
doctrine and even collateral censorship. One that is inclined to adopt these
regulatory theories likely believes that harassment in the workplace
undermines the seminal precepts of democracy by wantonly and
invidiously discriminating against entire classes of people. From this
perspective, the evil of workplace harassment is also exacerbated by the
prominence and centrality of the workplace in American society. In
essence, the dilemma that confronts decision makers charged with
thwarting the scourge of workplace harassment conjures the pivotal choice
that confronted Odysseus at the precipitous juncture between Scylla and
Charybdis. His epic choice foreshadows the formidable decision between
viewing untrammeled liberty and speech rights as inviolably hallow and
indispensable to democratic society or perceiving their free rein as a cause
of intractable inequality that is pernicious enough to bankrupt society of its
democratic ideals and impoverish it of its most fundamental values.
Odysseus chose to traverse by way of the six-headed monster rather that
that of the frightful vortex because he reasoned that it is better to forfeit the
lives of six of his men rather than to lose his entire fleet.22 7 Ultimately, the
main challenge that will continue to befuddle those adjudging the propriety
and constitutionality of hostile work environment doctrine is determining
which choice more closely parallels the merely harmful Scylla and which
one corresponds to the hopelessly lethal Charybdis.
225. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
226. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103.
227. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 191 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & Row 1967).
